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YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT: HOW WILL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT GET WHAT IT NEEDS IN A POST-CALEA, 
CYBERSECURITY-CENTRIC ENCRYPTION ERA? 
Stephanie K. Pell* 
In recent years, many technology companies have enabled 
encryption by default in their products, thereby burdening law 
enforcement efforts to intercept communications content or access 
data stored on smartphones by traditional means. Even before 
such encryption technologies were widely used, however, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) claimed its surveillance 
capabilities were “Going Dark” due to the adoption by consumers 
of new IP-based communication technologies, many of which are 
not subject to any surveillance-enabling obligations under the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”). 
The heightened tension produced by the introduction of encryption 
by default into an environment where terrorism has magnified the 
need for efficient law enforcement access (surveillance) supported 
by a newly-expanded CALEA framework is often framed as a 
contest between privacy and security. It is, however, more 
accurately framed as a security issue on both sides, one side which 
integrates traditional privacy concerns with the growing focus 
upon cybersecurity equities (the “cybersecurity” argument) into a 
critique of a second regime of “exceptional access” posited by law 
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enforcement to sustain its access advantages either: (1) by 
mandating that manufacturers insert “backdoors” into 
applications, devices and communications networks; or (2) by 
forcing companies, after-the-fact, to circumvent and undermine 
security features they purposefully build into their products and 
services. The cybersecurity and, incidentally, pro-privacy position 
rejects exceptional access as a dangerous fiction that would, 
among other things, create new attack surfaces, rendering 
networks more vulnerable to every form of predation, from 
financial crime and IP theft to cyber espionage, ultimately 
generating unacceptable risks to our national and economic 
security. The reconciliation of these competing visions of 
security—of law enforcement’s traditional public safety mission 
with cybersecurity—will require law enforcement to employ 
investigative techniques that may include, among other things, 
enhanced collection and exploitation of metadata, which is not 
generally thwarted by the use of encryption technology. Although 
many sources and forms of metadata are already available to law 
enforcement, the widespread adoption of Internet of Things 
(“IoT”) technology will generate additional forms of metadata, 
potentially revealing sensitive information that would have been 
difficult for the government to obtain in the past. Moreover, many 
IoT devices include microphones and cameras that could be used 
to eavesdrop remotely on targets, whether through direct hacking 
or through law enforcement’s power to  compel third parties to 
facilitate such eavesdropping, thereby potentially mitigating 
surveillance losses due to a target’s use of encrypted 
communications. 
This Article asserts that, for better or worse, law enforcement 
has entered a new post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric investigative 
era where the use of encryption and other security-enhancing 
technologies is an irreversible fact and where getting a warrant or 
court order will not, in and of itself, guarantee law enforcement 
access to communications data. In this new surveillance era, law 
enforcement will more often find itself forced to employ 
individualized “collection” solutions for specific investigations, 
rather than enjoy the ready-made access provided by a CALEA-
like regime. That is, law enforcement will need, among other 
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things, to target end-point devices, such as phones, computers and 
IoT devices, rather than the surveillance mechanisms mandated by 
a CALEA-like regime. As law enforcement seeks to employ old and 
new kinds of investigative techniques that involve neither designing 
access points into communications networks nor mandating 
circumvention of security features in mobile devices—policy 
choices necessary to support fundamental imperatives of 
cybersecurity—policy makers will be forced to consider how to 
facilitate, regulate, and oversee these law enforcement capabilities 
and activities, balancing what law enforcement may need against 
the social benefits of transparency and electronic privacy. The 
current debate over law enforcement exceptional access is more 
consistently divisive than not and, for the most part, not focused on 
how to get law enforcement what it needs without undermining 
fundamental principles of cybersecurity. A new dialogue on how to 
get law enforcement what it actually needs in a Post-CALEA, 
default-encryption era would be a much-needed step forward. That 
journey forward, however, will require a return to some of the 
historical debates about metadata collection and standards 
governing law enforcement access to various kinds of new 
revelatory metadata, such as that generated through the ever-
expanding IoT. Moreover, this journey will raise new legal, 
ethical, and policy questions about when and if law enforcement 
should be permitted to use IoT apertures for seeing and hearing 
activities inside the home. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It all started with a very small, unremarkable moment in time. 
In July of 1999, a constable from the Warwickshire Constabulary 
was awakened in the middle of the night and informed about a 
package judged to be suspicious by an x-ray technician at Coventry 
Airport in Coventry, England. 1  The package contained a .357 
Magnum revolver hidden inside a child’s toy boat.2 In the coming 
days and weeks, more packages containing weapons and 
ammunition concealed inside children’s toys and hollowed-out 
computer towers were discovered at Coventry airport, as well as 
airports and post offices up and down the East Coast of the United 
States, where they were intercepted en route to destinations 
overseas.3 Agents noticed that the serial number on the revolver 
from the first package had been filed down but forensic analysts 
reconstructed the number, which allowed law enforcement to trace 
the gun back to a dealer in South Florida and, subsequently, to a 
woman who had purchased it there.4 Moreover, the first group of 
packages discovered at the Coventry airport was mailed from 
South Florida via Express Mail, which allowed agents to identify 
the locations, times, and dates on which each package was mailed.5 
Cameras inside those post offices recorded video showing two men 
mailing the first package containing the .357 Magnum.6 
A comprehensive, labor-intensive investigation ensued. 7 
Federal agents obtained and reviewed express mail mailing 
records, driver’s license records, financial records, and forms 
                                                
 1 This factual scenario is taken from a real case prosecuted by the author of this 
Article in 1999–2000. United States v. Claxton, No. 99-06176 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 
2000) (Ferguson, J.). For more information about the case, see Mike Clary, Lax 
Florida Laws Attracted IRA, REGISTER-GUARD, June 8, 2000, at 6A, 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=ilNWAAAAIBAJ&sjid=hOsDAAAAIB
AJ&pg=6729%2C2038072. 
 2 United States v. Claxton, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
    7 Id. 
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documenting the purchase of firearms. 8  They also conducted 
physical surveillance by car and on foot, executed search warrants 
on places where the defendants lived, and performed various kinds 
of forensic analysis, among other investigative techniques, that 
notably did not involve the interception of communications 
content. 9  These efforts identified four individuals who were 
arrested, then indicted on various terrorism and gun smuggling 
charges.10 Ultimately, the investigation revealed these defendants 
were part of a cell of Irish Republican Army (“IRA”) operatives 
who came to the United States, purchased weapons illegally, hid 
them in children’s toys and hollowed-out computer towers, and 
mailed them to the Republic of Ireland, where they were to be 
smuggled into Belfast.11 This operation continued unabated during 
a critical time in the peace process. The weapons were intended to 
replace surreptitiously the cache of weapons being publicly turned 
over as part of the Good Friday Agreements.12 The “Troubles”13 
found their way to South Florida, and it took an exhaustive effort 
by FBI Miami’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, working with agents 
in other parts of the country and with foreign partners, to identify 
the individuals involved in and, ultimately, to disrupt this gun-
running operation.14 
This condensed factual narrative describing a case the author of 
this article investigated and prosecuted only sixteen years ago, in 
1999–2000, is a useful historical template for analysis of some of 
the critical discourse about current law enforcement investigative 
capabilities. The IRA case, a pre-September 11th terrorism 
investigation, occurred before the advent and ubiquitous adoption 
                                                
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13  See The Troubles, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles (“The 
Troubles refers to a violent thirty year conflict framed by a civil rights march in 
Londonderry on 5 October 1968 and the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 
1998. At the heart of the conflict lay the constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland.”). 
 14 See United States v. Claxton, supra note 1. 
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of smart phones, thus none of the rich metadata and tracking 
capabilities currently provided by modern mobile devices was 
available to the IRA case investigators. Indeed, while some of the 
IRA defendants were discovered to have had cell phones, these 
phones were not useful sources of information during the course of 
the investigation.15 In fact, no phone conversations or other forms 
of communications content were ever intercepted by law 
enforcement. 16  On the day agents planned to arrest all of the 
defendants, for example, one defendant evaded law enforcement’s 
physical surveillance of him and drove all the way from South 
Florida to Philadelphia, where he was later located and arrested 
without the aid of location data produced by a cellular phone.17 The 
most useful oral statements by any defendant did not come as a 
result of wiretaps, but through a Mirandized confession of the lead 
defendant, Conor Claxton, who told agents that this was a 
Provisional Irish Republican Army operation, that the peace 
process was not working, and that the weapons were meant to kill 
British police and Protestant paramilitary forces.18 
One current heated public discussion pertaining to law 
enforcement’s allegedly waning surveillance capabilities is 
generally referred to as the “Going Dark” debate, one aspect of 
which is commonly alluded to as the current “Crypto Wars.” This 
debate springs from claims by high-level law enforcement 
officials, including the FBI Director19 and the Manhattan District 
                                                
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See generally Statement of James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Before the House Judiciary Committee Hearing Encryption 
Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy, FBI, (Mar. 1, 2016), 
available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/encryption-tightrope-
balancing-americans-security-and-privacy (“When changes in technology hinder 
law enforcement’s ability to exercise investigative tools and follow critical leads 
we may not be able to root out the child predators hiding in the shadows of the 
Internet or find and arrest violent criminals who are targeting our 
neighborhoods. We may not be able to identify and stop terrorists who are using 
social media to recruit, plan, and execute an attack in our country. We may not 	
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Attorney,20 that law enforcement no longer has sufficient access to 
evidence and information necessary to fulfill its traditional public 
safety mission including, among other things, preventing terrorist 
attacks, locating kidnapped children, and apprehending pedophiles. 
The basis of this claim stems primarily from three recent burdens 
placed upon law enforcement’s access to communications data: (1) 
the default encryption of smartphone data using technology that 
prevents the phone manufacturer from being able to access it and 
turn it over to law enforcement, even in response to a warrant;21 (2) 
the protection of voice, video, and text communications with end-
to-end encryption where communication service providers do not 
have access to the encryption keys, thereby preventing them and, 
consequently, law enforcement from getting access to unencrypted 
communications; 22  and (3) the consumer adoption of IP-based 
communications services that, while not employing end-to-end 
encryption, nevertheless do not fall under the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act’s (“CALEA”) 23  mandate 
requiring service providers to provision their networks in a way 
that will enable law enforcement wiretapping capabilities (without 
                                                                                                         
be able to recover critical information from a device that belongs to a victim 
who cannot provide us with the password especially when time is of the essence. 
These are not just theoretical concerns.”). Id. 
 20 See generally REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY, (Nov. 2015) [hereinafter 
Manhattan DA report]. “Apple’s and Google’s decisions to enable full-disk 
encryption by default on smartphones means that law enforcement officials can 
no longer access evidence of crimes stored on smartphones, even though the 
officials have a search warrant issued by a neutral judge. Id. at i (emphasis in 
original). 
 21 Id.; see infra discussion Part II. 
 22 See infra discussion Part II. 
 23 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006). CALEA was enacted “to ensure that law 
enforcement surveillance capabilities remained intact during the move from a 
copper-wire phone system to digital networks.” Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, 
Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 421 
(2012). CALEA did not, however, require a telecommunications carrier to be 
capable of decrypting communications that were encrypted by a subscriber or 
customer unless the carrier “provided the encryption” and “possessed the 
information necessary to decrypt the communication.” 47 U.S.C. §1002(b)(3). 
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such purposeful provisioning, communications data may not be 
available to law enforcement).24 
While federal law enforcement agencies have not proposed 
new, specific legislative language to mandate access to new 
communications technologies,25 they have called for companies to 
create “backdoors”26 that will provide law enforcement access to 
                                                
 24 See infra discussion Part II. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
Chairman Tom Wheeler discussed the need to expand CALEA when it was 
believed that Islamic State perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attacks 
communicated using the Playstation 3 video game chat function (an IP-based 
communications service not covered by CALEA’s wiretapping mandate). Brian 
Fung and Andrea Peterson, FCC Chairman Suggests Expanded Wiretap Laws in 
Response to the Paris Attacks, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2015), available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/11/17/the-fcc-
suggests-expanded-wiretap-laws-in-response-to-the-paris-attacks/. 
 25 As of the writing of this Article, the Administration has indicated that it 
would not seek legislation to require companies to provide access to encrypted 
communications, although the FBI Director continues to “pres[s] companies for 
special government access.” Nicole Perloth and David E. Sanger, Obama Won’t 
Seek Access to Encrypted Data, Oct. 10, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/us/politics/obama-wont-seek-access-to-
encrypted-user-data.html. Senators Feinstein and Burr have, however, released a 
discussion draft of a bill, called the “Compliance With Court Orders Act of 
2016, that would require companies to render unintelligible data intelligible. See 
Andy Greenberg, The Senate’s Draft Encryption Bill is Ludicrous, Dangerous, 
Technically Illiterate, WIRED (April 8, 2016), 
http://www.wired.com/2016/04/senates-draft-encryption-bill-privacy-nightmare/ 
(“[T]he bill would make illegal the sort of user-controlled encryption that’s in 
every modern iPhone, in all billion devices that run Whatsapp’s messaging 
service, and in dozens of other tech products. ‘This basically outlaws end-to-end 
encryption,’ says Joseph Lorenzo Hall, chief technologist at the Center for 
Democracy and Technology. ‘It’s effectively the most anti-crypto bill of all anti-
crypto bills.’”). Id. See also Riana Pfekkerkorn, Here’s What the Burr-Feinstein 
Anti-Crypto Bill Gets Wrong, JUST SECURITY (April 15, 2016), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/30606/burr-feinstein-crypto-bill-terrible/. For an 
explanation of end-to-end encryption, see infra note 27. 
 26  See David Kravets, FBI Chief Tells Senate Committee We’re Doomed 
Without Crypto Backdoors, Ars Technica (Jul. 8, 2015) 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/07/fbi-chief-tells-senate-committee-
were-doomed-without-crypto-backdoors/ (“James Comey, the director of the 
FBI, told a Senate committee Wednesday that the government should have the 
right to lawfully access any device or electronic form of communication with a 	
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this information, including data “in motion” that is encrypted end-
to-end.27 The problem with this “request” and any legal mandate 
that might develop from it is that there are no “one way” backdoors 
available exclusively to law enforcement. Indeed, security experts 
warn that this notion of law enforcement “exceptional access” is a 
dangerous fiction that threatens to undermine our national and 
economic security. 28  As Professor Matt Blaze, cryptographer, 
computer scientist, and security researcher explained in written 
testimony prepared for a congressional hearing on encryption 
technology and possible policy responses: 
At first blush, a “lawful access only” mechanism that could be 
incorporated into the communications systems used by criminal 
suspects might seem like an ideal technical solution to a difficult policy 
problem. Unfortunately, harsh technical realities make such an ideal 
solution effectively impossible, and attempts to mandate one would do 
enormous harm to the security and reliability of our nation’s 
infrastructure, the future of our innovation economy, and our national 
security.29 
                                                                                                         
lawful court order, even if it is encrypted. Comey and another Justice 
Department official briefed the Senate Judiciary Committee and complained that 
keys necessary to decrypt communications and electronic devices often reside 
‘solely in the hands of the end user’—which they said is emblematic of the so-
called ‘Going Dark problem.’ Companies should bake encryption backdoors into 
their products to allow lawful access, they said.”). 
 27 End-to-end encryption can be generally described as “a method to secure 
data while in flight from one device to another . . . [and] loosely define[d] as a 
method to protect data in flight over a network such that only each end of the 
transaction has the ability to see the plaintext.” Branden Williams, WILL END TO 
END ENCRYPTION SAVE US ALL?, 3 (2010), available at 
https://www.brandenwilliams.com/brwpubs/WillEndtoEndEncryptionSaveUsAll
.pdf. 
 28 See Steven Bellovin, The Danger of Exceptional Access, CNN OPINION 
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/18/opinions/bellovin-encryption-
debate/(“It would be nice if we could safely and effectively change our 
cryptography to let us spy on the bad guys. Unfortunately, we can’t. So if we 
insist on systems that allow exceptional access, we end up weakening our own 
security without enhancing our ability to monitor them. And in the process, we 
may just make it easier for terrorists to exploit weakened cryptosystems -- and 
do us more harm in the process.”). 
 29  Encryption Technology and Potential U.S. Policy Responses: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Infor. Tech. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 	
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Reform, 114th Cong. 3-4 (2015) (written testimony of Professor Matt Blaze) 
https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/encryption-technology-and-potential-u-s-
policy-responses/ [hereinafter Blaze]; see also, HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., KEYS 
UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY REQUIRING GOVERNMENT 
ACCESS TO ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS 1–3 (2015), 
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/ 97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-
026.pdf (“As computer scientists with extensive security and systems 
experience, we believe that law enforcement has failed to account for the risks 
inherent in exceptional access systems . . . . There are three general problems. 
First, providing exceptional access to communications would force a U-turn 
from the best practices now being deployed to make the Internet more secure. 
These practices include forward secrecy — where decryption keys are deleted 
immediately after use, so that stealing the encryption key used by a 
communications server would not compromise earlier or later communications. 
A related technique, authenticated encryption, uses the same temporary key to 
guarantee confidentiality and to verify that the message has not been forged or 
tampered with. Second, building in exceptional access would substantially 
increase system complexity. Security researchers inside and outside government 
agree that complexity is the enemy of security — every new feature can interact 
with others to create vulnerabilities. To achieve widespread exceptional access, 
new technology features would have to be deployed and tested with literally 
hundreds of thousands of developers all around the world. This is a far more 
complex environment than the electronic surveillance now deployed in 
telecommunications and Internet access services, which tend to use similar 
technologies and are more likely to have the resources to manage vulnerabilities 
that may arise from new features. Features to permit law enforcement 
exceptional access across a wide range of Internet and mobile computing 
applications could be particularly problematic because their typical use would be 
surreptitious — making security testing difficult and less effective. Third, 
exceptional access would create concentrated targets that could attract bad 
actors. Security credentials that unlock the data would have to be retained by the 
platform provider, law enforcement agencies, or some other trusted third party. 
If law enforcement’s keys guaranteed access to everything, an attacker who 
gained access to these keys would enjoy the same privilege. Moreover, law 
enforcement’s stated need for rapid access to data would make it impractical to 
store keys offline or split keys among multiple keyholders, as security engineers 
would normally do with extremely high-value credentials. Recent attacks on the 
United States Government Office of Personnel Management (OPM) show how 
much harm can arise when many organizations rely on a single institution that 
itself has security vulnerabilities. In the case of OPM, numerous federal 
agencies lost sensitive data because OPM had insecure infrastructure. If service 
providers implement exceptional access requirements incorrectly, the security of 
all of their users will be at risk.”) 
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As part of the analysis supporting this assertion, Professor 
Blaze explains that modern digital systems are extremely 
vulnerable because computer science “does not know how to build 
complex, large-scale software that has reliably correct behavior.”30 
He goes on to describe the observed effects of increasing 
complexity in software systems upon their relative security: 
The number of software defects in a system typically increases at a rate 
far greater than the amount of code added to it. So adding new features 
to a system that makes it twice as large generally has the effect of 
making it far more than twice as vulnerable. This is because each new 
software component or feature operates not just in isolation, but 
potentially interacts with everything else in the system, sometimes in 
unexpected ways that can be exploited. Therefore, smaller and simpler 
systems are almost always more secure and reliable, and best practices 
in security favor systems [with] the most limited functionality possible. 
The goal is to minimize the “attack surface” 31  that any software 
vulnerabilities would expose.32 
A backdoor, a general term describing a mechanism or access 
point in a communications device or network that enables “the 
creator of software or hardware [to] access data without the 
permission or knowledge of the user,”33 creates an additional attack 
surface.34 Specifically, code must be written to create the backdoor 
and the code must have unfettered access to communications 
content.35 The additional code creates the potential for more bugs 
(more code, more bugs) that could be exploited to allow improper 
access to the system.36 Moreover, for a backdoor in an encrypted 
                                                
 30 Blaze, supra note 29, at 2. 
 31 For more about “attack surfaces,” see Pravetz, infra note 34. 
 32 Blaze, supra note 29, at 3. 
 33 Swire & Ahmad, supra note 23, at 460. 
 34 Jim Pravetz, What’s An Attack Surface?, THE ZERO TOUCH BLOG (Feb. 23, 
2013), http://www.armor5.com/blog/2013/what-is-attack-surface/ (“In the world 
of computer security, the term attack surface refers to the depth of methods a 
hacker can use to exploit your system.”). 
 35  Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian (Mar. 28, 2016). For more 
information about Dr. Soghoian’s background see https://www.dubfire.net/. 
 36  See Blaze, supra note 29, at 3. See also Chad Perrin, The Danger of 
Complexity: More Code, More Bugs, IT SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/the-danger-of-complexity-more-
code-more-bugs/3076 (“If you want to produce secure software you should 	
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communications service to offer interception functionality, the 
service provider must have momentary access to the unencrypted 
communications data.37 As a result, if and when security flaws in 
the system are discovered and exploited, the worst-case scenario 
will be unauthorized access to users’ communications.38 In other 
words, when compromised, an encrypted communications system 
with a lawful interception backdoor is far more likely to result in 
the catastrophic loss of communications confidentiality than a 
system that includes no capability allowing deliberate access to the 
unencrypted communications of its users.39 
The recent high-profile dispute between Apple and the FBI 
over the FBI’s inability to access data on an iPhone used by one of 
                                                                                                         
focus on following the advice. All else being equal if you can find a way to 
eliminate lines of code without compromising the proper functioning of the 
software you will probably improve the security of the software substantially.”). 
 37 Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian, (Mar. 28, 2016). 
 38  Id.; see also Storing Passwords, or The Risk of a No-Salt Diet, 
TECH@FTC (Mar. 21, 2013), http://techatftc.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/ 
storing-passwords-or-the-risk-of-a-no-salt-diet/. When discussing best practices 
for storing and protecting passwords, security researcher Dr. Steven Bellovin 
begins with a fundamental security principle: “It’s a prime rule of security: 
something that doesn’t exist can’t be stolen. Conversely, if something does exist, 
it can be stolen or leaked in many, many ways.” Id. This principle is applicable 
to law enforcement backdoors as well: If they exist, they will be discovered and 
exploited; see also Bellovin, supra note 28. 
 39  Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian, (Mar. 28, 2016). Researchers 
Micah Sheer, Eric Cronin, Sandy Clark, and Matt Blaze have done research 
illustrating ways to exploit wiretapping technology. See Signaling 
Vulnerabilities in Wiretapping Systems (Nov. 2005), http://www.computer.org/ 
csdl/mags/sp/2005/ 06/j6013-abs.html. Moreover, information revealing U.S. 
government targets of interception in the possession of third parties can prove to 
be an irresistible target for China. See Matthew J. Swartz, Google Aurora Hack 
Was Chinese Counterespionage Operation. Information Week Dark Reading 
(May 21, 2013) http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/google-
aurora-hack-was-chinese-counterespionage-operation/d/d-id/1110060. (“Former 
government officials with knowledge of the breach said attackers successfully 
accessed a database that flagged Gmail accounts marked for court-ordered 
wiretaps. Such information would have given attackers insight into active 
investigations being conducted by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies 
that involved undercover Chinese operatives.”). Id. 
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the San Bernardino shooters40  has further elevated and exposed 
tensions between the FBI and Silicon Valley over the decision, by 
some companies, to include strong encryption and other 
cybersecurity technologies in their products.41 At issue is the fact 
that, starting with iOS 8, Apple’s mobile devices encrypt user data, 
by default, with a key that is inaccessible to Apple. 42  Earlier 
versions of Apple’s operating system had encrypted the data with a 
key that remained accessible to Apple and, as a result, the 
company could extract data from seized devices for law 
                                                
 40 See In the Matter of the Search of An Apple iPhone Seized During the 
Execution of a Search Warrant on A Black Lexus IS300, California License 
Plate 35KGD203; Government’s Ex Parte Application For Order Compelling 
Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; 
Declaration of Christopher Pluhar; Exhibit (Feb. 16, 2016) (Central District of 
California ED No. 15-0451M) (hereinafter “Government’s Ex Parte Application 
For Order Compelling Apple”). At the time the government filed this Motion to 
Compel Apple’s assistance to unlock the iPhone, the government claimed that it 
was unable to access the encrypted content on the phone and that “Apple has the 
exclusive technical means which would assist the government in completing its 
search but has declined to provide that assistance voluntarily.” Id. at 3. Since 
that time, third party professional hackers have assisted the government with 
getting access to the encrypted data on the phone, see infra note 52. See Kevin 
Johnson, Jon Swartz and Marco della Cava, FBI Hack’s Into Terrorist’s iPhone 
Without Apple, USA Today (Mar. 29, 2016) http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2016/03/28/apple-justice-department-farook/82354040/. The 
government has, therefore, requested that the original order compelling Apple’s 
assistance be vacated. See In the Matter of the Search of An Apple iPhone Seized 
During the Execution of a Search Warrant on A Black Lexus IS300, California 
License Plate 35KGD203; Government’s Status Report (Mar. 18, 2016). 
 41 In reaction to this high-profile case, the House Judiciary Committee held a 
hearing to examine the matter (witnesses included the FBI Director, Apple’s 
General Counsel and the Manhattan DA); see https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/ 
the-encryption-tightrope-balancing-americans-security-and-privacy/. More 
colloquially, John Oliver presented a recent satiric piece on the FBI vs. Apple fight; 
see John Oliver, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Encryption (HBO), LAST 
WEEK TONIGHT, (Mar. 13, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsjZ2r9Ygzw. 
 42 See Apple’s Process Guidelines at 9, US Law Enforcement (“For all devices 
running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple will not perform iOS data extractions 
as data extraction tools are no longer effective. The files to be extracted are 
protected by an encryption key that is tied to the user’s passcode, which Apple 
does not possess.”). Id. at 9. 
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enforcement.43 In the case involving an iPhone 5C used by one of 
the deceased San Bernardino shooters, the FBI—via the All Writs 
Act44—sought to compel Apple to write and sign new code (a new 
operating system) that would disable two security features 
purposely engineered by Apple to protect data stored on a phone.45 
These features prevent “brute force” attempts to break a user-
created passcode by “[c]yber-attackers intent on gaining 
unauthorized access to a device . . . if given enough chances to 
guess and the ability to test passwords rapidly by automated 
means.”46 Specifically, “Apple imposes escalating time delays after 
the entry of each invalid passcode” and a setting, “if activated,” 
that “automatically deletes encrypted data after ten consecutive 
incorrect attempts to enter the passcode.”47 
While some have accused the FBI of trying to compel Apple to 
produce a backdoor for law enforcement,48 using backdoor in a 
metaphorical sense not as a term of art, from a technical 
perspective it would be more accurate to say that the FBI is trying 
                                                
 43 Id.; see also Government’s Ex Parte Application For Order Compelling 
Apple, supra note 40, at 3–4. 
 44 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (2012). (“The Supreme Court and all courts established 
by Act of Congress may issue all s necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”). 
 45 See Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple, supra 
note 40, at 4–8. 
 46  Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist 
Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel 
Assistance [hereinafter Apple’s Motion to Vacate Order] at 6, In re the Matter of 
the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant 
on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-
0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016.). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Apple characterizes the new operating system that the government attempts 
to compel it to create as “effectively a ‘back door’” Id. at 2. Security Researcher 
Jeffrey I. Schiller has also suggested that “[i]n some ways, Apple’s Signing key 
is a backdoor, in that it can be used to subvert the security of the iPhone. At this 
point Apple probably understands this as well. Fortunately, there are ways to 
close this particular backdoor. One simple way is to require that a phone be 
unlocked in order to install a software update.” See Jeffrey I. Schiller, It’s About 
Security, not Privacy, https://jis.qyv.name/home/pages/20160226 (last visited 
May 1, 2016). 
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to compel Apple to write code that exploits an existing 
vulnerability in the Apple iPhone 5C.49 That is, iPhones will run 
code that Apple has signed, regardless of whether that code is 
“good code” that protects the security of the system, or “bad code” 
that intentionally weakens the security of the system.50 The dangers 
of compelling the construction in communications networks of 
actual technical backdoors, which Professors Matt Blaze, Steve 
Bellovin, and others warn us all about, should not be conflated 
with what the FBI has attempted to compel Apple to do in the San 
Bernardino case. As the public and policy makers attempt to 
grapple with these very difficult and complex issues, such lexical 
confusion risks undermining the strong, powerful security 
arguments made against any compelled backdoor access. There 
should be an equally strong preference, therefore, for employing 
the term backdoor only in its precise technical sense when 
discussing the security of IP-based communications. 
There are, however, legitimate security questions and concerns 
surrounding the FBI’s demand in the San Bernardino case—but 
they should be framed accurately. While a full discussion of the 
particular security risks at issue is beyond the scope of this Article, 
two important policy considerations should be considered. First, as 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issues guidance strongly 
encouraging companies to use encryption to protect sensitive 
consumer information, 51  we should question concurrent 
                                                
 49 Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian (Mar. 28, 2016). 
 50 Id. 
 51  See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Start with Security: A Guide for 
Business (June 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/ 
start-security-guide-business (“Use strong cryptography to secure confidential 
material during storage and transmission. The method will depend on the types 
of information your business collects, how you collect it, and how you process 
it.”). Moreover, when a company promises strong encryption to its customers, 
the FTC expects delivery of strong encryption. See FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, Dental Practice Software Provider Settles FTC Charges It Misled 
Customers About Encryption of Patient Data (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/dental-practice-
software-provider-settles-ftc-charges-it-misled (“‘Strong encryption is critical 
for companies dealing with sensitive health information,’ said Jessica Rich, 	
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governmental actions that undermine the encryption and security 
features companies would purposely build into their products 
according to that guidance. Indeed, it is a bit incoherent for one 
arm of the government to encourage companies to develop and 
deploy the most secure, state of the art practices to secure customer 
data while another attempts to compel a company to undermine 
these very same practices. What equities does our government 
really want to protect here, and how are they to be promoted 
through its policies? 
Second, while the San Bernardino case was resolved because 
the FBI bought an exploit from third party professional hackers52 
that allowed them to access the data on the phone,53 the FBI and 
DOJ’s proposed use of the All Writs Act to attempt to compel 
Apple to write code and sign that undermines core security features 
built into the iPhone raises the question of what other kinds of 
actions a company could be compelled to do in order to assist with 
the execution of a court order.54 While each new kind of compelled 
action would be a legal question for courts to consider, security 
experts are concerned about the kind of precedent such an 
                                                                                                         
Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. ‘If a company promises 
strong encryption, it should deliver it.’”). 
 52 See Ellen Nakashima & Adam Goldman, No Links to Foreign Terrorists 
Found on San Bernardino iPhone So Far, Officials Say, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (April 14, 2016), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/no-links-to-foreign-terrorists-found-on-san-bernardino-iphone-so-
far-officials-say/2016/04/14/f1aa52ce-0276-11e6-9203-7b8670959b88_story.html 
(“Last month, a third party — professional hackers who hunt software flaws to 
sell — demonstrated to the bureau a method for unlocking the Apple iPhone of 
Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the shooters in the attack that killed 14 people.”). 
 53 See generally supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 54  Apple raises this concern in its Motion to Vacate Order. See Apple’s 
Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 46, at 4, when it suggests that “if Apple can 
be forced to write code in this case to bypass security features and create new 
accessibility, what is to stop the government from demanding that Apple write 
code to turn on the microphone in aid of government surveillance, activate the 
video camera, surreptitiously record conversations, or turn on location services 
to track the phone’s user? Nothing.” 
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expansive reading of the All Writs Act could set.55 For example, 
could the DOJ obtain a court order compelling companies to sign 
and deliver surveillance software though existing automatic update 
mechanisms? 56  Technologist Dr. Christopher Soghoian raises a 
significant cybersecurity harm that could flow from such 
compelled action: 
If consumers fear that the software updates they receive from 
technology companies might secretly contain surveillance software 
from the FBI, many of them are likely to disable those automatic 
updates. And even if you aren’t worried about the FBI spying on you, if 
enough other people are, you will still face increased threats from 
hackers, identity thieves and foreign governments. 
There are a lot of parallels between computer security and public 
health, and in many ways, software updates are like immunizations for 
our computers. Just as we want parents to get their children immunized, 
we want computers to receive regular software updates. Indeed, just as 
the decision by some parents to not vaccinate their children puts their 
entire community a at risk, so too the decision to turn off automatic 
updates not only impacts the individual, but other users and 
organizations, as those vulnerable, infected users’ computers will be 
used by hackers to target others.57 
To be clear, the prior technical discussion of backdoors and the 
broader security questions at issue in the San Bernardino case is 
summary in nature, relying on the analyses and opinions of 
respected researchers in the computer science and security 
community and policy makers at the FTC. Drawing on this 
expertise and the conclusion that backdoors created for “good 
guys” can and will also be exploited by “bad guys,” this Article 
begins with the premise that mandating the creation of backdoors 
in our communications networks and mobile devices is not a viable 
option for solving issues related to law enforcement access to 
communications data in an IP-based communications 
                                                
 55 See Christopher Soghoian, The Technology at the Heart of the Apple-FBI 
Debate, Explained, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/02/29/the-
technology-at-the-heart-of-the-apple-fbi-debate-explained. 
 56 See id. 
 57 Id. 
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environment.58 Moreover, this Article operates from the premise 
that we need to question and understand the broader security 
implications of an expansive reading of the All Writs Act, whether 
in the San Bernardino case or any other case where the government 
is attempting to compel a company to take actions that undermine 
the security of its networks, services, and products. 
This Article does not, however, discount the fact that law 
enforcement faces certain challenges in an environment where it 
may no longer be able either to obtain access to data stored on a 
cell phone 59  or to intercept plain text communications content 
though traditional methods—i.e. getting a warrant. Indeed, in some 
circumstances, law enforcement may never have access to relevant 
data, or at least not in time to assist with an investigation. For 
better or worse, due to the mandates of CALEA and earlier 
smartphone technical architectures that allowed companies to 
bypass a user’s password and provide data to the police, law 
enforcement became accustomed to an environment where the 
technical capabilities for gaining access to information were 
generally in place and easily available.60 But that environment is 
changing and, without some new kind of CALEA-like mandate, 
                                                
 58  Consistent with opinions expressed by computer scientists cited in this 
Article, security researcher Bruce Schneier succinctly explains the technical 
realities and consequences of any “exceptional access” scheme, whether 
providing access to encrypted data or not: 
As technologists, we can’t build an access system that only works for 
people of a certain citizenship, or with a particular morality, or only in 
the presence of a specified legal document. If the FBI can eavesdrop on 
your text messages or get at your computer’s hard drive, so can other 
governments. So can criminals. So can terrorists. This is not 
theoretical; again and again, backdoor accesses built for one purpose 
have been surreptitiously used for another. Vodafone built backdoor 
access into Greece’s cell phone network for the Greek government; it 
was used against the Greek government in 2004-2005. Google kept a 
database of backdoor accesses provided to the U.S. government under 
CALEA; the Chinese breached that database in 2009. 
Bruce Schneier, Security or Surveillance, LAWFARE (Feb. 1, 2016 1:01 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/security-or-surveillance. 
 59 See Statement of James Comey, supra note 19. 
 60 See infra Part II. 
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which seems unlikely in the near future,61 law enforcement will be 
forced to adapt in different ways. How it will and should adapt is a 
critical discussion that law enforcement, policy makers, and the 
public must have. 
The rhetoric surrounding the “Going Dark” debate or the 
current “Crypto War” has often been more divisive than 
productive62 and, for the most part, not directed at identifying and 
obtaining what law enforcement actually needs, rather than what it 
wants ideally, in the current technological environment.63 Indeed, 
                                                
 61 It is impossible to predict the future. As of the writing of this article, the 
Administration has indicated it is not proposing legislation to mandate law 
enforcement access to communications content. Two senators have released a 
discussion draft of a bill that would, however, mandate law enforcement access 
to communications content, even when communications are encrypted end-to-
end. This discussion draft is receiving significant criticism from the security 
community. See generally supra note 25; see also, Steven Bellovin, Problems 
with the Burr-Feinstein Bill SMBlog - STEVE BELLOVIN’S BLOG, 
https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/blog/control/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). 
 62  FBI Director James Comey has, for example, claimed that Apple and 
Google allow people to place themselves beyond the law: 
The notion that we would market devices that would allow someone to 
place themselves beyond the law, troubles me a lot. As a country, I 
don’t know why we would want to put people beyond the law. That is, 
sell cars with trunks that couldn’t ever be opened by law enforcement 
with a court order, or sell an apartment that could never be entered 
even by law enforcement. Would you want to live in that 
neighborhood? This is a similar concern. The notion that people have 
devices, again, that with court orders, based on a showing of probable 
cause in a case involving kidnapping or child exploitation or terrorism, 
we could never open that phone? My sense is that we’ve gone too far 
when we’ve gone there. 
See Kashmir Hill, FBI Director Says Apple and Google Are Putting Their 
Customers ‘Beyond the Law’ FORBES (Oct. 13, 2014, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/13/fbi-director-says-apple-
and-google-are-putting-their-customers-beyond-the-law/#589474aa81cf. 
 63 A report, Don’t Panic: Making Progress on the “Going Dark” Debate, THE 
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY (2016) 
[hereinafter Don’t Panic], is a noted exception to this statement. Another 
important exception is Steve Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark and Susan 
Landau’s companion articles, Going Bright: Wiretapping without Weakening 
Communications Infrastructure, 14 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 62 (2013) and 	
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some of the rhetoric used by government officials in the current 
“Crypto War” has, at times, framed the debate primarily as a 
privacy issue, at best minimizing, at worst obfuscating the serious 
cybersecurity risks at stake.64 A more constructive dialogue should 
                                                                                                         
Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet, 
12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2014). 
 64 See Devlin Bartlett, “FBI Chief: Pendulum on Privacy ‘Has Swung too 
Far,” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 16, 2014) http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2014/10/16/fbi-chief-pendulum-on-privacy-has-swung-too-far/ (“The head of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation urged Silicon Valley Thursday to reverse 
course on encrypting phone data, suggesting the pendulum on privacy issues 
‘has swung too far’ against the government in the wake of revelations by former 
National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.”) Id. More recently, 
statements about the dispute between the FBI and Apple over access to 
encrypted data stored on the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone by FBI Director 
Comey and Apple CEO Tim Cook illustrate their different perspectives on the 
role encryption plays in society and its affect on public safety and security and 
the rule of law: 
FBI Director James Comey put this new predicament starkly in a 
congressional hearing on the San Bernardino case in February. “Law 
enforcement, which I’m part of, really does save people’s lives, rescue 
kids, rescue neighborhoods from terrorists,” he said. “And we do that a 
whole lot through court orders that are search warrants. And we do it a 
whole lot through search warrants of mobile devices. So we’re gonna 
move to a world where that is not possible anymore? The world will 
not end, but it will be a different world than where we are today and 
where we were in 2014.” 
 
Comey, who declined to be interviewed on this subject, has framed the 
conflict as a choice between privacy and security, a zero-sum trade-off. 
If it were that simple, Apple would have a steep battle indeed: 
whatever benefits we get from encryption would have to be weighed 
against the possibility of lives lost to acts of terrorism. But Cook flatly 
rejects this view as a red herring. “I think it’s very simplistic and 
incorrect,” he says. “Because the reality is, let’s say you just pulled 
encryption. Let’s you and I ban it tomorrow. And so we sit in Congress 
and we say, Thou shalt not have encryption. What happens then? Well, 
I would argue that the bad guys will use encryption from non-
American companies, because they’re pretty smart, and Apple doesn’t 
own encryption. 
Lev Grossman, Inside Apple CEO Tim Cook’s Fight With the FBI, Time (Mar. 
17, 2016) http://time.com/4262480/tim-cook-apple-fbi-2/. 
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recognize the competing visions of security at issue—that is, when 
strong cybersecurity practices and the critical equities they help to 
protect65 may be at odds with certain aspects of law enforcement’s 
traditional public safety mission.66 Understanding and responding 
to the full scope and nature of law enforcement’s challenges in the 
current technological environment is a complex inquiry and 
analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, any 
such comprehensive, nuanced analysis will require more 
information, gathered over time, from law enforcement 
investigations. 
This Article attempts, however, to assist in focusing this 
analysis by examining how the ever-expanding Internet of Things 
(“IoT”) 67  could give law enforcement at least some of what it 
needs, both with respect to increasing the availability of revelatory 
metadata and providing new, less problematic apertures for the 
                                                
 65  “Each terrorist attack grabs headlines but the insidious theft of U.S 
intellectual property – software business plans, designs for airplanes 
automobiles pharmaceuticals etc. – by other nations does not. The latter is the 
real national-security threat and a strong reason for national policy to favor 
ubiquitous use of encryption.” Susan Landau, The National Security Needs for 
Ubiquitous Encryption, Appendix A, Don’t Panic, supra note 63. 
 66  See Grossman, supra note 64; see also, Bruce Schneier, Security or 
Surveillance, Appendix A, Don’t Panic, supra note 63 (“As framed in the media 
encryption debates are about whether law enforcement should have access to 
data or whether companies should be allowed to provide strong encryption to 
their customers. It’s a myopic framing that focuses only on one threat – 
criminals including domestic terrorists – and the demands of law enforcement 
and national intelligence. This obscures the most important aspects of the 
encryption issue the security it provides against a much wider variety of threats. 
Encryption secures our data and communications against eavesdroppers like 
criminals, foreign governments, and terrorists. We use it every day to hide our 
cell phone conversations from eavesdroppers and to hide our Internet purchasing 
from credit card thieves Dissidents in China and many other countries use it to 
avoid arrest. It’s a vital tool for journalists to communicate with their sources for 
NGOs to protect their work in repressive countries and for attorneys to 
communicate with their clients.”) Id. 
 67 The IoT, as used in this article, “refers to the ability of everyday objects to 
connect to the Internet and to send and receive data” Federal Trade Commission, 
Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World, (Jan. 2015), FTC 
IoT Staff Report at i, [hereinafter FTC IoT Staff Report]. 
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interception of communications content. Part of the method of 
examination will be a re-envisioning of what certain aspects of the 
1999 IRA investigation described at the beginning of this Article 
might look like when recontextualized in 2016. Taking this 
investigation forward in time imaginatively will allow for a 
discussion of how capabilities in the current technological 
environment might aid or hamper that investigation and 
prosecution, giving some perspective on: (1) the types of 
investigative capabilities law enforcement gains and loses in a 
metadata-rich, post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption 
environment; (2) how such gains and losses can affect an 
investigation; and (3) how, notwithstanding the revelatory nature 
of some kinds of metadata and metadata analysis, metadata cannot 
always be a substitute for communications content in an 
investigation and prosecution. 
Taking the IRA case forward in time will not illustrate every 
kind of investigative challenge facing law enforcement in the 
current technological environment. Rather, it is a vehicle to 
facilitate a productive dialogue about what law enforcement 
actually needs in a post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption 
environment. This discussion will, however, ultimately lead to 
some of the same privacy-focused debates about the appropriate 
scope of metadata collection and appropriate standards governing 
law enforcement access to metadata. It will also raise privacy 
questions about law enforcement use of IoT apertures to hear and 
see activities going on inside the home. 
Part II of this Article examines the “Going Dark” and current 
“Crypto War” debate as, at least in part, a resource issue, which, in 
turn, illustrates the need for a concerted focus on determining what 
law enforcement actually needs in a post-CALEA, cybersecurity-
centric encryption environment. Part III describes aspects of the 
IoT for purposes of understanding how it could aid law 
enforcement investigations. Part IV then examines how the IRA 
investigation described at the beginning of this Article might 
unfold in the current technological environment, with a particular 
focus on the IoT. Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
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II. THE CURRENT “CRYPTO WAR” AND “GOING DARK” 
DEBATE 
Part II examines one key issue affecting the “Going Dark” 
debate—a resource issue that was identified even before many 
Silicon Valley firms started to encrypt user data by default. This 
discussion not only leads to a critique of the “Going Dark” 
metaphor itself, but also suggests the need for a focused dialogue 
to determine what law enforcement actually needs in a post-
CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption environment. 
Accordingly, this Part ends by raising questions about how to 
evaluate what law enforcement needs in the current technological 
environment. 
In early 2011, approximately three years before Apple kicked 
off the latest battle in the Crypto Wars with its expansion of 
encryption on iOS, then FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni 
testified at a House Judiciary Committee hearing entitled Going 
Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New 
Technologies.68 Using the “Going Dark” metaphor, she explained 
the interception challenges facing law enforcement in a 
technological environment devoid of the wiretapping capabilities 
envisioned by CALEA: 
In the ever-changing world of modern communications 
technologies . . . the FBI and other government agencies are facing a 
potentially widening gap between our legal authority to intercept 
electronic communications pursuant to court order and our practical 
ability to actually intercept those communications . . . . We call this 
capabilities gap the “Going Dark” problem. As the gap between 
authority and capability widens, the government is increasingly unable 
to collect valuable evidence in cases ranging from child exploitation 
and pornography to organized crime and drug trafficking to terrorism 
and espionage—evidence that a court has authorized the government to 
collect. This gap poses a growing threat to public safety . . . . [D]ue to 
                                                
68  Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New 
Technologies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) 
[hereinafter Going Dark Hearing] (statement of Valerie Caproni, General 
Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/Caproni02172011.pdf. 
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the revolutionary expansion of communications technology in recent 
years, the government finds that it is rapidly losing ground in its ability 
to execute court orders with respect to Internet-based communications 
that are not covered by CALEA. This gap poses a growing threat to 
public safety . . . . [D]ue to the revolutionary expansion of 
communications technology in recent years, the government finds that 
it is rapidly losing ground in its ability to execute court orders with 
respect to Internet-based communications that are not covered by 
CALEA.69 
Notably, this segment from Caproni’s 2011 written statement 
does not address wiretapping problems due to encryption, but 
rather, the loss of capabilities due to consumer use of new IP-based 
communication services that are not covered by CALEA’s 
wiretapping mandate. In her oral testimony, Caproni does, 
however, describe an environment where law enforcement 
wiretapping capabilities could be unduly hampered by encryption, 
requiring labor intensive, individualized solutions that could 
overwhelm law enforcement resources: 
There will always be criminals, terrorists, and spies who use very 
sophisticated means of communications that are going to create very 
specific problems for law enforcement. We understand that there are 
times when you need to design an individual solution for an individual 
target . . . . We are looking for a better solution for most of our targets, 
and the reality is, I think, sometimes we want to think that criminals are 
a lot smarter than they really are. Criminals tend to be some-what lazy, 
and a lot of times, they will resort to what is easy. And, so long as we 
have a solution that will get us the bulk of our targets, the bulk of 
criminals, the bulk of terrorists, the bulk of spies, we will be ahead of 
the game. We can’t have individual—have to design individualized 
solutions as though they were a very sophisticated target who was self-
encrypting and putting a very difficult encryption algorithm on for 
every target we confront because not every target is using such 
sophisticated communications.70 
A year before Caproni testified, Google turned on HTTPS for 
Gmail, kick-starting a growing trend by tech companies enabling 
transport encryption by default.71 A year later, Apple upped the 
                                                
 69 Id. at 1.  
 70 Id. at 52. 
 71  See Ryan Singel, Google Turns on Gmail Encryption to Protect Wi-Fi 
Users, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/01/google-	
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ante by deploying end-to-end encryption in iMessage and 
FaceTime apps, thereby preventing the company from decrypting 
the communications content because it does not have access to the 
keys.72 Apple also took steps to secure data stored on its mobile 
products by enabling disk encryption by default in its iOS 
operating system. Initially, this process used a key that was 
accessible to the company but, since 2014, the key encrypting data 
must be derived from the user’s password, rendering these data 
inaccessible to the firm.73 More specifically, while earlier versions 
                                                                                                         
turns-on-gmail-encryption-to-protect-wi-fi-users/ (Gmail users will now default 
to HTTPS as communications travel between Google’s servers and a user’s 
computer. Google’s prior default was to use HTTPS only for log-in, not for 
entire email sessions. While this switch does not encrypt the email, it prevents 
simple sniffing by hackers over insecure Wi-Fi connections). Id. While Google’s 
use of HTTPS is arguably the start of a trend, the use of HTTPS does not 
significantly frustrate law enforcement surveillance because emails sent by 
Gmail users, at least for now, remain unencrypted while they sit stationary on 
Google’s servers. Google has access to the stored email messages and generally 
can provide them to law enforcement when served with a warrant. More 
specifically, because Gmail’s website uses HTTPS encryption, data sent 
between Gmail users and Google is encrypted as it travels between the user and 
Google’s servers. As such, that data cannot be intercepted by law enforcement in 
“real time” with the assistance of a wiretap order served on a broadband ISP or 
telecommunications carrier. Law enforcement can, however, access the stored 
communications by compelling to Google to produce them with a court order. 
 72 See John Evering, Push for a More Secure Digital Privacy Irreversible 
After Edward Snowden Leaks, THE NATIONAL (Feb. 11, 2015) 
http://www.thenational.ae/business/technology/push-for-a-more-secure-digital-
privacy-irreversible-after-edward-snowden-leaks. For an explanation of end-to-
end encryption, see supra note 25. With respect to iMessage text messages, 
however, such messages are backed up by default, without encryption, to 
Apple’s iCloud service. Accordingly, unless the user disables the backup 
function, the text messages remain available to law enforcement with the 
appropriate court order, generally a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 
631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 73 See generally supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text. See also Matthew 
Green, Why Can’t Apple Decrypt Your iPhone, 
CRYPTOGRAPHYENGINEERING.COM (Oct. 4, 2014), 
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-apple-decrypt-your-
iphone.html. Green notes: 
What’s happened in the latest update is that Apple has decided to 
protect much more of the interesting data on the device under the 	
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of iOS used encryption with a key not known to Apple for some 
data, iOS 8 expanded the use of this encryption to more kinds of 
user data—such as photos and text messages—that are generally of 
interest to law enforcement.74 Google has also stated that it intends 
to encrypt its Android operating system by default, but the firm 
and its hardware partners have encountered technical issues 
resulting in most Android phones still remaining unencrypted.75 
More recently WhatsApp, a popular messaging service owned by 
Facebook and used by a billion people, now uses end-to-end 
encryption by default, and other firms such as SnapChat and 
Google are reported to be working on similar enhancements to 
their own services.76 
                                                                                                         
user’s passcode. This includes photos and text messages -- things that 
were not previously passcode-protected, and which police very much 
want access to . . . . Previous versions of iOS also encrypted these 
records, but the encryption key was not derived from the user’s 
passcode. This meant that (provided one could bypass the actual 
passcode entry phase, something Apple probably does have the ability 
to do via a custom boot image), the device could decrypt this data 
without any need to crack a password. 
Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Andrew Cunningham, Android 6.0 Re-implements Mandatory Storage 
Encryption for New Devices, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 19, 2015, 3:53 PM),  
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/10/android-6-0-re-implements-mandatory-
device-encryption-for-new-devices; interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian 
(April 14, 2016). 
 76  See Danny Yadron, Facebook, Google and WhatsApp Plan to Increase 
Encryption of User Data, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2016, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/14/facebook-google-
whatsapp-plan-increase-encryption-fbi-apple; see also Cade Metz, Forget Apple 
vs. the FBI: WhatsApp Just Switched on Encryption for a Billion People, WIRED 
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbi-whatsapp-
just-switched-encryption-billion-people/ (“[T]oday, the enigmatic founders of 
WhatsApp, Brian Acton and Jan Koum, together with a high-minded coder and 
cryptographer who goes by the pseudonym Moxie Marlinspike, revealed that the 
company has added end-to-end encryption to every form of communication on 
its service. This means that if any group of people uses the latest version of 
WhatsApp—whether that group spans two people or ten—the service will 
encrypt all messages, phone calls, photos, and videos moving among them. And 
that’s true on any phone that runs the app, from iPhones to Android phones to 	
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For law enforcement, encryption that is enabled by default that 
also places keys solely in the hands of device holders significantly 
disrupts traditional forms of surveillance that have relied on third 
parties’ (telecommunications providers and ISPs) having access to 
communications content, at least in most circumstances. As 
Caproni alludes to in her 2011 congressional testimony, without 
such third party access, law enforcement must find individualized 
investigative solutions. 77  In other words, time, energy, and 
resources must be expended to determine how to acquire data 
about a specific target that would otherwise readily be available 
from third parties with an appropriate court order without all these 
additional transaction costs. Caproni explains that, while law 
enforcement efforts can accommodate some of these 
individualized investigative necessities, an environment where 
encryption by default was the rule rather than the exception poses a 
potential financial and human resource burden that threatens 
significant harm to law enforcement’s ability to pursue and fulfill 
its public safety mission.78 
While it is certainly fair to recognize the changing investigative 
environment for law enforcement and the burden it places on law 
enforcement resources, the Berkman Center Report questions the 
very accuracy of the “Going Dark” metaphor itself.79 The authors 
assert that “[s]hort of a form of government intervention in 
technology that appears contemplated by no one outside of the 
most despotic regimes, communication channels resistant to 
surveillance will always exist.” 80  The Berkman Report broadly 
concludes that “communications in the future will neither be 
                                                                                                         
Windows phones to old school Nokia flip phones. With end-to-end encryption in 
place, not even WhatsApp’s employees can read the data that’s sent across its 
network. In other words, WhatsApp has no way of complying with a court order 
demanding access to the content of any message, phone call, photo, or video 
traveling through its service. Like Apple, WhatsApp is, in practice, stonewalling 
the federal government, but it’s doing so on a larger front—one that spans 
roughly a billion devices.”). Id. 
 77 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.  
 78 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 79 See Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 9–15. 
 80 See id. at 2. 
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eclipsed into darkness nor illuminated without shadow.” 81  The 
report then offers several findings to support the thesis that, despite 
the recent developments in the employment of encryption by 
default in consumer communication products,” law enforcement is 
not “Going Dark.”82 Two of these findings have particular import 
on how the IoT, as part of the current technological environment, 
gives law enforcement at least some of what it needs. Specifically, 
the IoT and its ever-expanding networked sensors may provide 
platforms and apertures for viewing activities and recording 
communications content.83 Moreover, the IoT adds to the metadata-
rich investigative environment available to law enforcement. 
Because most metadata is difficult to encrypt and is likely to 
remain unencrypted for the foreseeable future, it will continue to 
enhance law enforcement capabilities.84 
These two observations about the IoT raise broader questions 
about how metadata and communications content function in 
investigations—that is: (1) how they aid investigations and 
prosecutions; (2) what different purposes they may serve; and (3) 
to what extent the ever-expanding availability and law enforcement 
access to metadata can counterbalance the loss of CALEA-like 
mandates for wiretapping capabilities for interception of 
communications content. Viewing the IoT as an ever-expanding 
array of potential apertures to aid surveillance also requires an 
examination of the extent to which such surveillance portals 
counterbalance some of the challenges posed to law enforcement 
by increasing encryption of communications content. 
To be clear, these are not easy questions to answer because, to 
date, we have not been framing the underlying inquiry correctly. 
The Manhattan DA, for example, cites the fact that, between 
September 17, 2014 and October 1, 2015, his office was unable to 
execute 111 searches of smartphones running iOS 8. 85  As one 
                                                
 81 See id. at 2. 
 82 See id. at 8. 
 83 See id. at 12–15 
 84 See id. at 6. 
 85 Manhattan DA report, supra note 20, at 9. 
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commenter observes, this example illustrates “the paradox at the 
heart of this debate: Because the data in question is encrypted, we 
will never know what information has been lost to analysts and 
investigators.” 86  What we do not know is how many of these 
“failed search” cases, nevertheless, resulted in successful 
prosecutions. In other words, how often was encryption the 
dispositive issue? If such cases were prosecuted successfully, those 
prosecutions would inform the discussion about how encryption by 
default on smartphones was actually affecting law enforcement 
investigations. Rather than discussing such information, the DA’s 
report focuses on the assumption that the “out of reach” data 
“would have been relevant to the case[s] [at issue] and to the 
investigation of additional crimes or perpetrators.”87 In order to 
better understand what law enforcement needs in the context of a 
current and changing technological environment that must 
accommodate competing visions of security, “we should stop 
looking for ‘evidence’ showing that terrorists and criminals use 
encryption and should instead look at the evidence that is available 
to analysts and investigators.”88 Only when we begin the complex 
task of assessing and analyzing the available information, or the 
information that could be available to law enforcement without a 
backdoor mandate, can we begin to understand how further to 
enable law enforcement investigations. 
III. THE IOT 
General Michael Hayden, former director of both the CIA and 
NSA, has made strong public statements against mandating 
backdoors.89 Like many of the security researchers quoted in this 
                                                
 86 Marshall Erwin, The High Standard of Proof in the Encryption Debate, 
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 5, 2016, 9:35 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/29177/ 
high-standard-proof-encryption-debate/. 
 87 Manhattan DA Report, supra note 20, at 9. 
 88 See Erwin, supra note 86. 
 89 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Former NSA Chief: I ‘Would Not Support’ 
Encryption Backdoors, VICE MOTHERBOARD, (Oct. 6, 2015, 2:38PM), available 
at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/former-nsa-chief-strongly-disagrees-with-
current-nsa-chief-on-encryption. 
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Article, General Hayden believes the security of the United States 
is “better served by stronger encryption, rather than baking in 
weaker encryption.”90 But Hayden warns civil libertarians not to 
rush to “get his autograph” because, as a former high-level official 
in the Intelligence world, he would forego backdoors in favor of 
“bulk data and metadata [collection.]”91 While General Hayden’s 
intelligence-based perspective92 provides an important foil to the 
FBI Director’s perspective and illustrates what is perhaps a 
significant tension between law enforcement and intelligence 
community perspectives in the context of the “Going Dark” 
debate,93 he is certainly not the first to recognize the revelatory 
nature of metadata. Justice Sotomayor, for example, observes in 
her United States v. Jones94 concurrence that aggregated location 
data: 
[G]enerates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations. See, e.g., People v. 
Weaver, 12 N. Y. 3d 433, 441–442, 909 N. E. 2d 1195, 1199 (2009) 
(“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private 
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the 
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment 
center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour 
                                                
 90 Id. 
 91  Patrick Howell O’Neill, Former NSA Chief Says U.S. Can Get Around 
Encryption with Metadata, Argues Against Backdoors, THE DAILY DOT, (Jan 5, 
2016, 10:42 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/michael-hayden-encryption-
debate-clinton-bush. General Hayden has, for example, argued for the necessity 
of the bulk collection of American’s domestic calling records under a program 
previously authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Court under Section 215 of the 
USA Patriot Act. See Hayden-Soghoian Debate: Privacy vs. Intelligence 
Collection available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aRklrv3r34. 
 92 To be fair, General Hayden acknowledges that in the context of the “Going 
Dark” debate, “[e]ncryption is ‘a law enforcement issue more than an 
intelligence issue’ [because,]” Hayden argued “frankly intelligence gets to break 
all sorts of rules to cheat to use other paths.” Id. 
 93  See Carrie Cordero, LAWFARE, Is There a National Security-Law 
Enforcement Divide on “Going Dark”?, Lawfare (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM) 
available at https://lawfareblog.com/there-national-security-law-enforcement-
divide-going-dark. 
 94 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, (2012). 
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motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay 
bar and on and on”). The Government can store such records and 
efficiently mine them for information years into the future. Pineda-
Moreno, 617 F. 3d, at 1124 (opinion of Kozinski, C. J.).95 
The IoT—which “refers to the ability of everyday objects to 
connect to the Internet and to send and receive data”96—promises 
to augment immeasurably a communications environment already 
teeming with metadata that reveals “personal information, habits, 
locations and physical conditions over time.”97 Indeed, as the FTC 
notes in a January 2015 Staff Report, “experts estimate that, as of 
[2015], there will be 25 billion connected devices, and by 2020, 50 
billion.”98 The kinds of IoT devices now available to consumers are 
already too numerous to list here—and new ones come on the 
market every day—but illustrative examples include smart 
thermostats, automation systems for home lights and appliances, 
and bracelets that track your physical activity.99 Such products are 
proliferating to the degree that the Berkman Center Report projects 
that the IoT “has the potential fundamentally to shift the way we 
interact with our surroundings[:]”100 
Appliances and products ranging from televisions and toasters to bed 
sheets, light bulbs, cameras, toothbrushes, door locks, cars, watches and 
other wearables are being packed with sensors and wireless 
connectivity. Numerous companies are developing platforms and 
products in these areas. To name but a few, Phillips, GE, Amazon, 
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Tesla, Samsung, and Nike are all working 
on products with embedded IoT functionality, with sensors ranging 
from gyroscopes, accelerometers, magnetometers, proximity sensors, 
microphones, speakers, barometers, infrared sensors, fingerprint 
readers, and radio frequency antennae with the purpose of sensing, 
collecting, storing, and analyzing fine grained information about their 
surrounding environments. These devices will all be connected to each 
other via the Internet, transmitting telemetry data to their respective 
vendors in the cloud for processing.101 
                                                
 95 Id. at 955. 
 96 FTC IoT Staff Report, supra note 67.  
 97 Id. at ii. 
 98 Id. at i. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 13. 
 101 Id. 
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One researcher, Charles Givre, explored and tested the kinds of 
information that can be learned about an individual through the IoT 
networked devices she uses.102  Specifically, Givre presented the 
results of an experiment designed to document the wealth of 
information collected and stored through everyday use. 103  An 
abstract of his presentation notes that Givre “approached [the] 
experiment like a law enforcement or intelligence investigation, 
beginning with a bit of seed knowledge about the target, and built a 
profile about the target using the data that was available via these 
devices’ APIs104 and the data they transmit over the Internet.”105 
The IoT devices at issue in Givre’s investigation include a Wink 
Hub (a platform that allows control of Internet-connected home 
devices from a single screen), a Nest Thermostat, and an 
Automatic car dongle.106 Examination of even a small segment of 
Givre’s investigation suggests the broad scope of data potentially 
available to law enforcement through following the IoT. The 
investigation begins with Givre focusing only with the knowledge 
that the “target” (the target in this case is Givre) owned a Wink 
Hub.107 From this point, Givre was able to determine the target’s 
                                                
 102 Lauren Kirchner, Your Smart Home Knows A Lot About You, PROPUBLICA, 
(Oct. 9, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/your-smart-home-
knows-a-lot-about-you?google_editors_picks=true. 
 103 Id. 
 104 “In the simplest terms APIs are sets of requirements that govern how one 
application can talk to another. APIs aren’t at all new whenever you use a 
desktop or laptop APIs are what make it possible to move information between 
programs, for instance by cutting and pasting a snippet of a LibreOffice 
document into an Excel spreadsheet. System-level APIs makes it possible for 
applications like LibreOffice to run on top of an OS like Windows in the first 
place.” Brian Proffitt, What API’s Are And Why They’re Important, READWRITE, 
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://readwrite.com/2013/09/19/api-defined. 
 105 Charles Givre, Booze Allen Hamilton, What Does Your Smart Device Know 
About You? STRATA + HARDOOP (Sept. 30, 2015), http://conferences.oreilly.com/ 
strata/big-data-conference-ny-2015/public/schedule/detail/42710. 
 106 Charles S. Givre, Booz Allen Hamilton, Presentation at Strata NYC 2015, 
What Does Your Smart Device Know About You?, available at 
http://cdn.oreillystatic.com/en/assets/1/event/132/What%20does%20your%20sm
art%20device%20know%20about%20you_%20%20%20Presentation.pdf. 
 107 Id. at slide 5. 
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Facebook ID and Twitter handle, and to identify the other devices 
owned or controlled by the target, which included a Nest 
Thermostat.108 From the Nest Thermostat, Givre learned that the 
target uses Comcast for Internet service, that the target lives in 
Pikesville, Maryland and owns both an iPhone and iPad.109 
Although access to the data produced by these devices is 
typically protected by an email address and password, 110  Givre 
notes that the devices store data on remote cloud servers, rather 
than locally.111 Remote cloud storage often gives law enforcement 
the ability to obtain data, since it is held by and accessible to a 
third party provider to whom law enforcement need only present 
an appropriate court order. While there may be no mandates to 
require retention of the data, having access to it is often part of a 
company’s revenue stream and product functionality.112 If Givre’s 
investigation were an actual one performed by law enforcement, 
the identification of these various accounts could provide a range 
of information about the target, including his interests and 
associates (via Twitter) and his likely comings and goings from the 
home (via Nest).113  
Again, this discussion only highlights a small selection of IoT 
networked devices that may operate in a target’s life and references 
only some of the kinds of data they could provide to law 
enforcement. What is particularly important about Givre’s work 
for law enforcement (and what may already be part of law 
enforcement investigative practices) is his illustration of how it is 
                                                
 108 Id. at slide 22. 
 109 Id. at slide 41. 
 110 Id.at slide 9. 
    111 Id. at slide 7. 
 112 Consider, for example, that the iCloud backup service is enabled by default 
on Apple devices (the automatic backup can, of course, be disabled by users). 
Although Apple encrypts iCloud backup services, it holds the keys. Law 
enforcement can, therefore, compel Apple to turn over data stored in the iCloud 
with the appropriate court order, generally a warrant. The Berkman Center 
Report also notes that “the majority of businesses that provide communication 
services rely on access to user data for revenue streams and product 
functionality should a password be forgotten.” Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 3. 
 113 Givre, supra note 105, at slides 43–48. 
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possible to start with a single bit of information about a networked 
device used by a target, then build a profile about the target’s 
broader use of networked devices, which can lead to relevant 
information for an investigation. Following this meticulous 
investigative path—following the IoT—enables law enforcement to 
design individualized investigative plans for targets based on the 
kinds of devices they use and the kinds of metadata or public 
source content (think Twitter and Facebook)114 such devices and 
services reveal. 
It should also be noted that Givre performed his investigation 
without any “privileged access”—that is, without the ability to 
compel information from ISPs in order to determine what devices 
are present in the home and calling back to the manufacturer. Law 
enforcement could, however, compel such information from, for 
example, Comcast or Verizon.115 
In addition to the public source content that may be revealed 
through following the IoT, the IoT provides a range of apertures 
that may allow law enforcement to record private conversations or 
view activities occurring in private spaces. These surveillance 
“opportunities” can generally be categorized in two different ways, 
the first of which is company assistance. As noted in the Berkman 
Center Report, “[t]he audio and video sensors on IoT devices will 
open up numerous avenues for government actors to demand 
access to real-time and recorded communications.” 116  In other 
words, law enforcement may be able to compel assistance from 
companies whose products are capable of recording conversations 
or activity, “whether through one’s own smartphone, an Amazon 
Echo, a baby monitor, an Internet-enabled security camera, or a 
futuristic ‘Elf on a Shelf’ laden with networked audio and image 
sensors.”117 
                                                
 114 Of course, law enforcement may not need IoT information to find a target’s 
public Twitter or Facebook account. 
 115  See Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional 
Records Access (SCA),18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2010); Pen Registers and Trap 
and Trace Devices (Pen/Trap), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2010). 
 116 Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 13. 
 117 Id. at 13–14. 
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As noted in the Berkman Center Report, there is some legal 
support for this kind of compelled company assistance. 
Specifically, in The Company v. United States,118 the FBI, under 
Wiretap Act authority for “bugging” individuals suspected of 
criminal activity, sought to compel the Company to use its on-
board driver assistance technology to record conversations going 
on inside a car. 119  One feature of the technology allows the 
Company to open “a cellular connection to a vehicle and listen to 
oral communications within the car” as part of the stolen vehicle 
recovery mode.120 When the system is in stolen recovery vehicle 
mode, however, passengers in the car cannot use any of the other 
“on board” system services—they are completely disabled.121 If, 
for example, the customer presses an emergency button while the 
recovery mode is enabled, the customer will not be connected to 
the response center—only the FBI will be listening in on the 
line.122 Ultimately, the court did not order the Company to assist 
the FBI because such compelled assistance violated the “minimum 
of interference” language of the Wiretap Act.123 While the court 
found that the “minimum of interference” requirement allows for 
“some level of interference with customers’ service in the 
conducting of surveillance,” such “eavesdropping is not performed 
with ‘a minimum of interference’ if a service is completely shut 
down as a result of the surveillance.”124 While this case was not 
decided in the government’s favor, other kinds of IoT company-
compelled assistance may be upheld, as long as the surveillance 
                                                
 118 The Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 119 Id. at 1133. 
 120 Id. at 1133–34. 
 121 Id. at 1134, 1145. 
 122 Id. at 1135. 
 123 Id. at 1145 (“Our interpretation of the minimum of interference language is 
bolstered by our reading of title III which we believe does not evince a 
congressional intent to authorize surveillance in the face of complete disruption 
of a wire and electronic communication service for a particular customer.”). 
 124 The Company, 349 F.3d at 1145 (emphasis in original). 
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would not completely disable the intended use of the product or 
service.125 
Second, IoT networked devices can provide apertures for 
hacking (assuming such hacking is lawful), 126  where law 
enforcement would enable audio or video features of a networked 
device or use one device to obtain access to the target’s network or 
user credentials, potentially facilitating the collection of 
information from a user’s computer or other networked device. In 
recent written congressional testimony, the Director of National 
Intelligence, James Clapper, explained that: 
“Smart” devices incorporated into the electric grid, vehicles—including 
autonomous vehicles—and household appliances are improving 
efficiency, energy conservation, and convenience. However, security 
industry analysts have demonstrated that many of these new systems 
can threaten data privacy, data integrity, or continuity of services, in the 
future, intelligence services might use the IoT for identification, 
surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for 
recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.127 
Former CIA Director, David Petraeus, echoed this same 
message earlier in 2012, explaining that: 
Items of interest will be located, identified, monitored, and remotely 
controlled through technologies such as radio-frequency identification, 
sensor networks, tiny embedded servers, and energy harvesters — all 
connected to the next-generation internet using abundant, low-cost, and 
high-power computing.128 
                                                
 125 Id. (“We need not decide precisely how much interference is permitted. A 
minimum of at least precludes total incapacitation of a service while interception 
is in progress.”). 
 126 See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63; see also infra note 
130. 
 127  Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: 
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 114th Cong. 1 (2016) 
(statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence), 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-hearing. 
 128  Spencer Ackerman, CIA Chief: We’ll Spy on You Through Your 
Dishwasher, WIRED, (Mar. 15, 2012, 5:35 PM) 
http://www.wired.com/2012/03/petraeus-tv-remote. 
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Moreover, a researcher looking at IoT security from a military 
perspective characterizes IoT as “a new attack surface.”129 While 
these are Intelligence Community and Military perspectives, some 
such capabilities are not per se outside the reach of all law 
enforcement, as long as they are appropriately authorized, 
resourced, and overseen. 130  Indeed, a group of distinguished 
                                                
 129  KONRAD WRONA, SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS: A MILITARY 
PERSPECTIVE 503 (IEEE, 2015) Specifically, the attack surface consists of: “IoT 
devices (i.e. sensors and actuators),” “Communication channels between the 
devices as well as  between the devices and the back-end system,” “IoT-specific 
back-end applications,” and “Back-end data storage.” Id. 
 130 See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63. There are a number 
of law enforcement hacking activities (often referred to as Network Investigative 
Techniques) that are becoming public, with at least one dating back thirteen 
years. See Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Used Hacking Software Decade Before iPhone 
Fight, New York Times (April 13, 2016) http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/04/ 
14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10-years-ago-files-show.html?_r=2. 
In early 2003, FBI agents hit a roadblock in an investigation called Operation 
Trail Mix. Id. While agents had been intercepting phone calls and emails of their 
targets, encryption software suddenly made the emails unreadable. Id. The 
investigators, in what is believed to be first example of the FBI “remotely 
installing surveillance software, known as spyware or malware, as part of a 
criminal wiretap” convinced a judge to let them “remotely and secretly” install 
the malware on the targets’ computers to help agents thwart the encryption. Id. 
“‘This was the first time that the Department of Justice had ever approved such 
an intercept of this type,’ an FBI agent wrote in a 2005 document summing up 
the case.” Id. 
 Other, more recent examples of law enforcement hacking include: In the 
Matter of the Search of Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”) for Email 
Address texan.slayer@yahoo.com, Third Amended Application For A Search 
Warrant (Case No. 12-sw-05685-KTM) (US Dist. Ct., D. of Colorado) (Dec. 11, 
2012) (“[T]he NIT is designed to collect the items described in Attachment B – 
i.e., information that may assist in identifying the computer, its location, other 
information about the computer, and the user of the computer, all of which is 
evidence of violations of Section 1038 of Title 18, United States Code (False 
information and hoaxes.”). Id. at 16; In Re Warrant to Search A Target 
Computer At Premises, Memorandum and Order (Case. No. H-13-234M) (US 
Dist. Ct. Southern Dist. Of Texas, Houston Division) (April 22, 2013) (“The 
search would be accomplished by surreptitiously installing software designed 
not only to extract certain stored electronic records but also to generate user 
photographs and location information over a 30-day period. In other words, the 	
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computer scientists have identified a need to develop a “lawful 
hacking” legal framework that could support law enforcement 
exploitation of existing vulnerabilities in software and mobile 
devices, which the authors maintain is a more secure alternative to 
the purposeful introduction of backdoors into our networks and 
mobile devices.131 
Part IV will look at how the IRA case might be investigated in 
2016, with a particular focus on capabilities and information that 
may be available from exploitation of networked IoT devices. 
IV. BRINGING THE IRA INVESTIGATION FORWARD IN TIME: 
WHAT KIND OF CAPABILITIES AND INFORMATION WOULD BE 
AVAILABLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT NOW? 
Through a reasonable exercise of the imagination, it is possible 
to envision how the IRA investigation might proceed in 2016’s 
technological environment. The purpose of this exercise is to 
illustrate at least some of the current investigative capabilities and 
information types available to analysts and investigators, in order 
to compare and contrast them with the tools available during the 
actual investigation and thus begin to assess what law enforcement 
actually needs in a post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption 
era. This single case cannot offer a comprehensive analysis on the 
subject. Indeed, an ongoing, rigorous case-by-case analysis is 
needed with law enforcement providing: (1) information about 
failures to obtain evidence due to an inability to acquire IP-based 
communications data (in motion or stored on a mobile), which 
consequently prevented the pursuit of a successful investigation 
and prosecution; and (2) information about failures to obtain 
evidence due to an inability to acquire IP-based communications 
data (in motion or stored on a mobile device) that, nevertheless, 
result in a successful investigation and prosecution. In other words, 
we need continually to assess what is available, what is missing, 
and how the inability to access information in a timely fashion is 
                                                                                                         
Government seeks a warrant to hack a computer suspected of criminal use. For 
various reasons explained below, the application is denied.”). Id. at 1. 
 131 Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63. 
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affecting law enforcement investigations. With this kind of 
information in hand, policy makers would be in a much better 
position to determine what kinds of new capabilities law 
enforcement actually needs and what new statutory authorities are 
necessary for law enforcement to employ those capabilities. Part of 
this analysis must include an examination of the differing functions 
metadata and content 132  may serve in an investigation and 
prosecution and the speed at which such information may or may 
not be available to law enforcement in the current technological 
environment. 
The condensed narrative of the IRA investigation presented in 
the Introduction can, more or less, be outlined in the following 
way: 
(1) An ongoing weapons smuggling operation was discovered. 
In addition to stopping the flow of weapons, law enforcement 
needed to determine both who was part of the operation and the 
intended use or purpose for the acquired weapons.133 
(2) Answering these questions began with tracing the first gun 
back to a gun dealer in South Florida, which identified a female 
gun purchaser. 134  Express Mail information on the recovered 
packages led agents back to the particular post offices in South 
Florida where some of the mailings occurred, and video of the 
mailings and express mail records kept by the Post Offices helped 
agents identify two men who mailed packages.135 
                                                
 132 For purposes of this discussion, content is being defined per the definition 
found in the Wiretap Act: “‘contents’, when used with respect to any wire, oral 
or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) 
(2004). I have argued elsewhere that the content/non-content distinction as 
defined the in the Wiretap Act and the Pen/Trap statute is no longer a viable, 
workable distinction in an IP-based communications environment. See Steven 
M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan Landau, & Stephanie K. Pell, It’s Too 
Complicated: The Technological Implications of IP-based Communications on 
Content/ Non-Content Distinctions and the Third Party Doctrine, (forthcoming) 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. (2016). 
 133 See United States v. Claxton, supra note 1. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
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(3) Physical surveillance of these identified suspects led to the 
identification of an additional male suspect.136 Through discovery 
of locations where more weapons were purchased, it was 
determined that the male suspect had also purchased some of the 
weapons.137 
(4) While others associated with the original four suspects were 
identified in the course of the investigation, no one else was 
indicted, save one gun dealer who had falsified federal forms 
required to sell the weapons to the female and male gun 
purchasers.138  Moreover, the means of identification of potential 
co-conspirators was limited mostly to physical surveillance and the 
examination of various kinds of records associated with the gun 
purchases, the mailing of the packages, and financial accounts 
where deposits were made to fund the gun smuggling operation.139 
(5) While investigators had suspicions that the gun running 
operation might be tied to IRA activities,140  the purpose of the 
operation and the defendants’ intentions for the weapons were not 
known until the defendants were arrested and the lead defendant 
told agents that this was an IRA operation and that the weapons 
were meant to kill British police and Protestant paramilitary 
forces.141 The lead defendant also indicated that the peace process 
had failed and the weapons were meant to replace the cache of 
weapons being publicly turned over as part of the Good Friday 
Agreements. 142  Various documents and other physical items 
retrieved in post-arrest searches of places where the defendants 
lived corroborated the statements made by the lead defendant.143 
These statements were necessary evidence for the purpose of 
                                                
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. For example, the packages were en route to addresses in the Republic of 
Ireland and the return addresses on the packages came to non-existent places and 
all of the defendants, other than the gun dealer, were of Irish descent. Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
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proving the most serious charge lodged in the case, a conspiracy to 
murder or maim persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 956(a)(1). 144  Additional weapons, some that were 
packaged and ready to be mailed, were also discovered in the post-
arrest searches of homes.145 
By taking this case forward in time to the technological 
environment of 2016, which requires some reasonable speculation 
and imagination, it is possible to envision how metadata and 
content would assist investigators. Once the first weapon was 
discovered at Coventry Airport, the three critical challenges were: 
(1) finding and/or intercepting all additional weapons that were 
part of the operation; (2) identifying all of the individuals involved 
in the operation; and (3) determining the purpose of the operation. 
It would be fair to characterize the defendants as practicing 
relatively good operational security (“OPSEC”) for 1999. While 
investigators discovered that some of the defendants had cell 
phones, the phones did not provide useful information during the 
course of the investigation—indeed, one subject evaded physical 
surveillance on the day of arrest and traveled north, only to be 
located later in Philadelphia.146 Additional co-conspirators were not 
located through cell phone usage and, to our knowledge, the 
defendants did not communicate over the phone.147 As far as we 
could tell, per actual physical surveillance, communication 
occurred during in person meetings at bars, gas stations, and inside 
of defendants’ apartments.148 
In 2016, however, it is a bit harder to “stay off the grid.” The 
use of cell phone location data, whether through real-time tracking, 
historical records, cell-tower dumps, or community of interest 
requests,149 which can reveal previously unknown associations by 
                                                
 144 Id. 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 For a description of different ways that law enforcement uses cell phone 
location information to track suspects, see Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher 
Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward Reasonable Standards for Law 	
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showing phones that “occupied” the same places at the same 
time,150 are now available to law enforcement. Assuming the 2016 
suspects 151  are carrying mobile devices, it arguably would be 
quicker and more efficient today to identify their associates and 
possible co-conspirators than it was in 1999. As previously noted, 
the IRA case was an ongoing operation when discovered, and only 
the four defendants were arrested and prosecuted for purchasing 
and shipping the weapons overseas.152 
Let’s assume, as was true in 1999, that the suspects do not 
communicate using unencrypted voice communication channels. 
More specifically, let’s assume, according to current tradecraft, 
that when they do communicate using a smartphone, they use an 
App for sending end-to-end encrypted texts or making encrypted 
calls. The content of those communications is, therefore, not 
available to law enforcement through the traditional means either 
of serving a provider with a warrant for stored communications or 
a Title III Wiretap order for intercepting the communications in 
real-time. Law enforcement, however, needs to know the purpose 
of the smuggling operation, since it would assist in determining 
who may be in danger, as well as provide important evidence of 
intent, which goes towards proving that the suspects are conspiring 
to murder or maim individuals in a foreign country. The metadata 
from cell phones or other mobile or wearable devices is unlikely to 
reveal that kind of information. As previously referenced, it is 
more likely to assist in finding and tracking a suspect, learning 
about the patterns of his daily life and mapping out his web of 
associates. 153  In the actual IRA case, the content evidence 
necessary to reveal the purpose of the smuggling operation and that 
the defendants were part of a conspiracy to murder or maim 
                                                                                                         
Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 117, 119–33, 152–53 (2012). 
 150 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 149, at 152–53. 
 151 The term “suspect” is used when talking about a 2016 re-visioning of the 
IRA case and “defendant” is used when talking about the defendants in the 
actual IRA case in 1999–2000. 
 152 See United States v. Claxton, supra note 1. 
 153 See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955. 
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individuals in a foreign country did not come until after the 
defendants were arrested and the lead defendant gave a confession 
to the FBI case agent. As is often the case in an investigation, there 
are no guarantees of “forthcoming” evidence—you work an 
investigation and use the lawful resources available to you, some 
of which involve good interviewing skills. 
Still, in today’s environment, law enforcement is right to be 
concerned that communications content, which can be critical to 
the successful investigative and prosecutorial elements of a case, 
(including the ability to stop an attack before it happens), is 
becoming increasingly unavailable through the traditional means 
of compelling the information from a third party with the 
appropriate court order. One method to gain access to encrypted 
communications associated with smartphones is to hack the phones 
of targets, infecting them with malware capable of capturing voice 
communications and keystrokes before they are encrypted. 154 
Moreover, the IoT is providing new kinds of apertures that could 
facilitate the sound and video recording of communications and 
activities occurring in private spaces, whether via company 
assistance or through hacking by the police. Determining what 
apertures may be available and exploitable based on the kind of 
IoT devices enabled in a home or office could, in some cases, be a 
time-intensive process. Accordingly, while communications may 
be accessible, such access may not be as readily available as in a 
CALEA-like framework. Given that the defendants were not 
talking on phones in the IRA case, it would have been worth 
considering how IoT devices could have been exploited in their 
apartments or the cars they drove, had such technology only been 
available in 1999. Of course, bugging a room is not a new 
technique, but it generally requires direct physical access to the 
room, often through surreptitious means. Direct physical access is 
risky, both in terms of physical risk to the agents and the risk of 
                                                
 154  Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian (April 14, 2016); see also 
Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63; for a discussion of law 
enforcement hacking see supra note 130. 
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compromising the investigation, 155  which presumably limits the 
regularity156 and efficacy of the technique. 
With the IoT, however, such “bugging,” whether to record 
sound or video, is not limited by physical access, nor is it 
necessarily burdened due to the risk of discovery or harm to the 
officers. Moreover, unlike the traditional wiretapping of phones, 
recording the sounds and sights going on inside the home has the 
potential to reveal a broader array of sensitive, personal 
information, some of which could also be highly relevant to an 
investigation. 
In the IRA case, all defendants were convicted of a series of 
charges relating to the gun smuggling operation.157 None, however, 
was convicted of the most serious charge of conspiring to murder 
or maim individuals in a foreign country—even though the lead 
defendant’s post-arrest statements were admitted in the trial 
without any limiting instructions regarding their applicability to the 
other defendants.158 Sometimes, no matter how strong the evidence 
is, juries do not convict. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The FBI Director and Manhattan DA raise legitimate concerns 
about how a post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption era 
will affect law enforcement’s ability to carry out its traditional 
public safety mission. This Article takes the position that mandated 
backdoors are not a viable option for enabling law enforcement 
access to communications data because the attendant cybersecurity 
risks are too great. As policy makers grapple with these competing 
                                                
 155 A law enforcement officer could be harmed or an operation thwarted if 
agents were caught trying to install a bug. 
 156 In the most recent Wiretap Act Report, only three instances of wiretapping 
via “Oral, (Incl. Microphone, Eavesdrop)” were reported for the calendar year 
Jan. 1, 2014 through Dec. 31, 2014 in comparison to 2,270 instances of 
wiretapping via “Wire (Incl. Any Type of Telephone: Standard, Cell, Mobile)” 
Wiretap Report 2014 (Dec. 31, 2014), at Table 6, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2014. 
 157 See United States v. Claxton, supra note 1. 
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visions of security, they must determine what law enforcement 
actually needs in the current technological environment. The IoT 
will augment immeasurably the variety and amount of revelatory 
metadata, which can assist law enforcement in myriad ways, from 
locating and tracking a target, to identifying his associates and 
discerning the routines and patterns of activity in his life. With 
respect to communications content, the IoT offers new apertures 
for audio and video recording of communications and activities 
inside public spaces. 
As policy makers consider what law enforcement actually 
needs and what, if any, changes to the law are required for law 
enforcement to execute certain functions effectively, the pubic 
discussion must also account for the privacy implications of, 
among other things, the smart-sensored home. An IoT-enabled 
home, office, or other private space offers law enforcement the 
ability to enter the home and record conversations and activities in 
ways that were not possible in the past, save for the relatively 
infrequent installation of a bugging device, which required 
physical access to the home. Perhaps a useful counterbalance to 
law enforcement’s challenges in the current technological 
environment, the smart home is a potentially bountiful surveillance 
platform. Some yet uncreated avatar of the popular child’s toy “Elf 
on the Shelf” 159  or its Jewish equivalent, the “Mensch on a 
Bench,”160 may ultimately become a “Snoop on the Stoop” invited 
to sit in our homes with a seemingly benign doll’s smile, sporting 
one of many new sets of IoT eyes and ears. 
                                                
 159  Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 14. See THE ELF ON THE SHELF, 
http://elfontheshelf.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). 
 160 See THE MENSCH ON A BENCH, http://themenschonabench.com (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2016). 
